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Abstract 
Using data from the 2000 to 2012 Major League Baseball seasons, this article investigates how changes to 
revenue sharing in the 2007 collective bargaining agreement altered within-team payroll inequality. Results 
indicate that inequality within teams decreased after the 2007 bargaining agreement. This reduced inequity is 
concentrated among those teams that were already experiencing relatively higher levels of inequality. This 
indicates that changes to revenue sharing should help increase competitive balance within the league. 
Additionally, the reduction in inequality occurs only among hitters and not pitchers. These results highlight how 
collective bargaining can have heterogeneous effects on groups of workers despite there being no requirement 
of differential treatment. 
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I. Introduction 
This article uses data from the 2000 to 2012 Major League Baseball (MLB) seasons to analyse how changes made 
to revenue sharing in the 2007 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) altered within-team payroll inequality. 
From 1997 to 2006, team owners and player union representatives agreed to a form of revenue sharing that 
resulted in a regressive tax. Under the 1997 CBA, the marginal tax rate equalled 20% and 41% for high- and low-
revenue clubs, respectively (Maxcy, 2009). The analogous rates in the 2003 CBA were 40% and 47%, respectively 
(Zimbalist, 2003). The regressive tax structure created an incentive for low-revenue teams to divest in player 
talent and not compete rigorously in the talent market, thereby potentially reducing competitive balance within 
the league (Maxcy, 2009). Due to concerns of growing competitive imbalance, the 2007 CBA modified the 
structure of revenue sharing to correct the incentive to divest in player talent. Changes to the mechanisms used 
to distribute funds resulted in a marginal tax rate equalling 31% for all teams (MLB, 2006). 
Many view the modifications to revenue sharing in the 2007 CBA to be one of the largest changes made to the 
operation of MLB since the beginning of the century. To date, there has been no evaluation of the effects of this 
policy change. Results from this analysis should be of interest to sports researchers due to the potential 
implications for competitive balance. Revenue sharing’s intent is to allow smaller market/revenue teams to 
invest in player talent and become more competitive. This may affect not only players’ salaries but also team-
level payroll inequality. Research shows that larger payrolls and lower levels of inequality increase team 
performance (Depken, 2000; Jewell and Molina, 2004; Annala and Winfree, 2011) and reduced payroll inequities 
are associated with increased individual player performance (Bloom, 1999). 
These results will be of interest not only to sports researchers but also to those interested in industrial relations 
broadly defined. Unlike other industries, there is a large amount of detailed data available on firm/worker 
performance and worker salary for the professional sports industry. Studying MLB allows the ability to 
understand how negotiations made through collective bargaining can alter the salary structure within an 
industry. An additional advantage to studying MLB is the clear distinction made between different groups of 
workers, specifically hitters and pitchers. The analysis will focus on overall within-team inequality in addition to 
inequality experienced by hitters and pitchers, separately. This allows for an understanding as to how changes 
made to CBAs can have heterogeneous effects on different groups of workers despite there being no 
requirement of differential treatment. 
II. Data and Methodology 
The analysis sample includes players on teams’ opening day rosters reported by USA Today from 2000 to 2012. 
Using a sample of players from opening day rosters is consistent with previous research on within-team payroll 
inequality (Jewell et al., 2004). The data used here come from USA Today, Doug’s NBA and MLB Statistics and 
Rodney Fort’s database.1 The analysis begins by constructing yearly Gini coefficients for each team from 
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Here, yij is the real salary of player i on team j, 𝑦?̅? is average team salary and nj is the sample size. Following a 
similar methodology as Jewell et al. (2004), Gj is regressed on a set of variables that fall into three categories: 
team-specific, market-specific and time.2 The general form of the equation is 
𝐺𝑗𝑡 = 𝑥𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑓𝑎𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2006 + 𝛽4𝑇 + 𝑢𝑗𝑡 
(2) 
In Equation 2, xjt contains team-specific measures including winning percentage, real revenue (measured in 
millions of dollars), a dummy variable equalling one if the team competes in the National League, average player 
experience and a cubic in average real salary (measured in millions of dollars). The variable fanjt is the fan cost 
index and represents the team’s market-specific variable. The index equals the real cost of four average-price 
tickets, two small draft beers, four small soft drinks, four regular-size hot dogs, parking for one car, two game 
programs and two least-expensive, adult-size adjustable caps.3 This index measures not only the potential size of 
the team’s market but also the intensity of fan participation in the stadium itself. 
Variables post2006 and T are time-related variables. The variable of interest, post2006, is an indicator equalling 
one during the years after 2006 and captures the effects of the 2007 CBA and the changes made to revenue 
sharing in MLB. The variable T is a time-trend, and ujt is the time-varying error. Equation 2 is estimated using OLS 
three times, once when the Gini is calculated using salaries of hitters and pitchers combined, again when it is 
calculated only using salaries of hitters, and finally when the Gini is calculated using only salaries of pitchers.4 To 
see how modifications to revenue sharing affected team-level inequality at different points in the Gini 
distribution, the general form of Equation 2 is estimated also using quantile regression techniques. 
III. Results 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis for the combined sample of hitters 
and pitchers before and after the changes made to revenue sharing. There are not many differences between 
periods; however, average team salary increases by $152,000, and team revenues are $20 million higher in the 
latter period. Figure 1 presents estimates of the average team-level Gini for hitters and pitchers combined and 
separately. Combined, there appears to be no trend in average inequality. The Gini fluctuates around 0.577, and 
there has been an increase in average inequality since 2007. Only examining the combined Gini masks some 
interesting differences between hitters and pitchers. Aside from 2000, 2007 and 2008, hitters experience more 
inequality on a team than pitchers do. Not only is there a difference in the level of inequality between the two 
groups but also inequality’s trend differs. For hitters, the average team Gini increases significantly from 2000 to 
2004, declines until 2007 and subsequently increases. The average team Gini for pitchers decreases from 2000 
to 2004, increases until 2008 and subsequently declines. 
Fig. 1. Average team Gini by year and player type 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of selected variables 
  2000–2006 2007–2012 
Gini coefficient 0.579 0.575 





Source: Author’s calculations from the data. 
Tables 2–4 represent the results from Equation 2 for the combined sample, hitters and pitchers, respectively. 
The second column in each table represents results when using OLS to estimate Equation 2, and columns three 
through 11 show results from the quantile regressions at the deciles of the Gini distribution. The parameter 
estimate associated with post2006 shows the effects of the 2007 CBA and the changes made to revenue sharing 
on within-team inequality. Focusing on column two of Table 2, the combined sample, it appears that the 
changes made to the 2007 CBA reduced inequality within teams, on average. When focusing on the quantile 
regressions, this reduction only occurs for those teams in the seventh, eighth and ninth deciles of the Gini 
distribution. In other words, the changes made to the 2007 CBA only reduced inequality among those teams 
that already had higher levels of payroll inequality. Research shows that lower levels of inequality are associated 
with greater team performance (Depken, 2000; Jewell and Molina, 2004; Annala and Winfree, 2011). Therefore, 
the changes to revenue sharing should help enhance competitive balance. 
Winning percentage 0.500 0.500 
Average experience 5.943 5.596 
National League 0.533 0.533 
Real revenue ($1,000,000) $ 72.50 $ 92.81 
Real fan cost index $ 81.55 $ 88.94 
Table 2. Gini OLS and quantile regressions – combined 
  OLS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Trend 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.001 0.002 −0.001  
(0.13) (0.39) (0.22) (0.55) (0.35) (0.25) (0.64) (0.63) (0.91) (0.26) 
Post 2006 = 1 −0.022 −0.024 −0.017 −0.029 −0.010 −0.017 −0.020 −0.034 −0.036 −0.026  
(2.21)** (1.00) (1.07) (1.72)* (0.86) (1.42) (1.50) (2.49)** (2.54)** (2.15)** 
Avg salary 0.352 0.416 0.303 0.356 0.356 0.353 0.305 0.255 0.235 0.322  
(4.10)*** (3.05)*** (3.57)*** (3.85)*** (4.38)*** (3.60)*** (3.15)*** (3.12)*** (2.44)** (3.68)*** 
Avg salary2 −0.162 −0.177 −0.135 −0.161 −0.157 −0.160 −0.141 −0.121 −0.118 −0.155  
(3.75)*** (2.35)** (2.90)*** (3.00)*** (3.52)*** (3.07)*** (2.66)*** (2.81)*** (2.26)** (3.26)*** 
Avg salary3 0.023 0.024 0.019 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.020 0.017 0.017 0.022  
(3.42)*** (1.94)* (2.32)** (2.40)** (2.88)*** (2.60)*** (2.22)** (2.36)** (1.91)* (2.68)*** 
Winning percentage −0.095 −0.060 −0.053 −0.053 −0.120 −0.113 −0.103 −0.147 −0.128 −0.109  
(2.15)** (0.59) (0.94) (0.98) (1.99)** (2.04)** (1.93)* (2.96)*** (2.39)** (2.37)** 
Avg experience −0.024 −0.022 −0.023 −0.025 −0.023 −0.026 −0.027 −0.020 −0.018 −0.023  
(6.83)*** (2.87)*** (4.37)*** (5.28)*** (5.63)*** (7.12)*** (7.73)*** (5.18)*** (3.63)*** (5.42)*** 
National League = 1 0.016 0.024 0.027 0.027 0.021 0.016 0.014 0.009 0.007 0.015  
(2.20)** (2.55)** (3.70)*** (3.90)*** (2.70)*** (3.31)*** (2.18)** (1.23) (1.07) (2.48)** 
Revenue (1,000,000) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  
(0.72) (0.90) (0.00) (0.17) (0.75) (1.39) (1.94)* (2.28)** (1.77)* (1.68)* 
Fan cost index 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
(0.04) (0.01) (1.19) (0.87) (0.87) (0.73) (0.85) (1.26) (0.71) (0.07) 
Constant 0.516 0.425 0.460 0.469 0.527 0.542 0.584 0.603 0.611 0.590  
(12.70)*** (4.95)*** (9.79)*** (8.22)*** (11.63)*** (10.04)*** (12.29)*** (14.24)*** (10.63)*** (12.19)*** 
R2 0.20                   
N 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
Notes: Dependent variable is team Gini index. 
For the OLS regression, robust t-statistics clustered at the team level are shown in parentheses. 
For the quantile regressions, t-statistics based upon bootstrapped SEs are shown in parentheses. Bootstraps are calculated from 100 repetitions. 
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
Source: Author’s calculations from data. 
 
  
Table 3. Gini OLS and quantile regressions – hitters 
  OLS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Trend 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002  
(0.44) (0.28) (0.09) (0.00) (0.64) (1.32) (1.90)* (1.71)* (0.89) (0.90) 
Post 2006 = 1 –0.037 –0.039 –0.037 –0.023 –0.036 –0.041 –0.053 –0.055 –0.056 –0.054  
(2.81)*** (1.52) (1.73)* (1.23) (2.11)** (2.68)*** (3.74)*** (3.60)*** (2.92)*** (2.65)*** 
Avg salary 0.347 0.362 0.311 0.310 0.288 0.303 0.258 0.259 0.251 0.202  
(3.75)*** (2.13)** (2.85)*** (5.04)*** (4.66)*** (4.51)*** (5.17)*** (4.72)*** (3.35)*** (2.73)*** 
Avg salary2 –0.140 –0.135 –0.117 –0.127 –0.114 –0.117 –0.102 –0.111 –0.102 –0.078  
(3.27)*** (1.82)* (2.30)** (4.36)*** (3.82)*** (3.64)*** (4.17)*** (4.21)*** (2.77)*** (2.11)** 
Avg salary3 0.017 0.015 0.013 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.011 0.008  
(2.94)*** (1.67)* (1.84)* (3.83)*** (3.00)*** (2.85)*** (3.12)*** (3.32)*** (2.04)** (1.53) 
Winning percentage –0.068 –0.013 –0.024 –0.021 –0.038 –0.086 –0.101 –0.111 –0.153 –0.083  
(1.24) (0.09) (0.21) (0.24) (0.51) (1.80)* (1.93)* (2.24)** (2.74)*** (1.35) 
Avg experience –0.025 –0.034 –0.029 –0.019 –0.024 –0.025 –0.025 –0.022 –0.026 –0.025  
(7.95)*** (4.02)*** (3.84)*** (4.63)*** (6.13)*** (7.67)*** (8.01)*** (6.69)*** (8.19)*** (8.21)*** 
National League = 1 0.017 0.031 0.034 0.022 0.027 0.024 0.022 0.012 0.010 0.000  
(1.95)* (2.21)** (3.10)*** (1.90)* (3.39)*** (3.79)*** (3.15)*** (1.33) (1.06) (0.05) 
Revenue (1,000,000) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  
(1.32) (1.07) (0.86) (0.82) (0.70) (0.76) (1.33) (2.88)*** (3.11)*** (2.49)** 
Fan cost index 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
(0.46) (0.38) (0.13) (0.16) (0.34) (0.34) (0.67) (1.10) (1.51) (1.37) 
Constant 0.479 0.371 0.432 0.418 0.480 0.522 0.564 0.558 0.616 0.659  
(8.83)*** (2.71)*** (5.81)*** (7.39)*** (8.33)*** (11.07)*** (13.57)*** (13.03)*** (10.39)*** (10.44)*** 
R2 0.25                   
N 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
Notes: Dependent variable is team Gini index. 
For the OLS regression, robust t-statistics clustered at the team level are shown in parentheses. 
For the quantile regressions, t-statistics based upon bootstrapped SEs are shown in parentheses. Bootstraps are calculated from 100 repetitions. 
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
Source: Author’s calculations from data. 
Concerning the other variables in Table 2, National League teams have higher levels of inequality, on average, 
than American League teams, which indicates different institutional factors between the two divisions. In the 
American League, teams are required to invest in a designated hitter (DH), whereas there is no DH in National 
League games. Quantile regressions show that this effect is somewhat larger towards the bottom of the 
distribution. Increases in team winning percentage reduce team inequality, on average; this result is more 
pronounced for those teams that are in the top of the Gini distribution. Team revenues have no impact on 
payroll inequality, on average. However, there appears to be a positive and statistically significant effect towards 
the top of the Gini distribution. The fan cost index has no effect on within-team payroll inequality, suggesting 
that market-specific factors do not influence payroll inequality as suggested by Jewell et al. (2004). 
An increase in average experience reduces team-level inequality. Players with at least 6 years of service time are 
eligible for free agency, which is associated with larger increases in pay since players can bargain with multiple 
teams and have their salary dictated by market forces (Hill and Spellman, 1983). Those with between 3 and 5 
years of service time are eligible for final offer salary arbitration, which is also associated with larger increases in 
pay, particularly for those who file for arbitration (Hill and Jolly, 2014). The CBA has strict rules determining pay 
for younger players with less than 3 years of experience. Thus, as suggested by Jewell et al. (2004), as the 
average experience of a team increases, pay for an increasing number of players is dictated more by market 
forces as opposed to strict rules in the CBA, and overall inequality falls. Finally, the estimated parameters 
associated with the cubic in average salary show that a team’s inequality increases, decreases and then 
increases again as average salary rises, which is consistent with results in Jewell et al. (2004). 
Table 3 shows that modifications made to revenue sharing reduced inequality for hitters, on average. The effect 
is concentrated in the middle and top of the Gini distribution and increases, in absolute value, when moving 
from the fourth to the ninth deciles. Many of the other variables used in the analysis have similar effects on 
inequality as seen in Table 2. Interestingly, results in Table 4 indicate that the changes made to the 2007 CBA did 
not affect team-level inequality for pitchers. This finding highlights the idea that uniform regulations within CBAs 
can have heterogeneous effects on different groups of workers. The other independent variables shown in Table 
4 have similar effects on team-level inequality for pitchers as those found in Table 2 for the combined sample. 
Table 4. Gini OLS and quantile regressions – pitchers 
  OLS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Trend –0.003 –0.001 –0.002 –0.001 –0.003 –0.004 –0.003 –0.003 –0.004 –0.003  
(1.17) (0.27) (0.87) (0.41) (1.11) (1.69)* (1.72)* (1.34) (2.12)** (1.26) 
Post 2006 = 1 –0.001 0.011 0.013 0.002 –0.004 0.006 –0.006 –0.012 –0.001 –0.016  
(0.11) (0.56) (0.70) (0.08) (0.21) (0.36) (0.44) (0.89) (0.07) (0.79) 
Avg salary 0.504 0.414 0.431 0.440 0.445 0.466 0.541 0.501 0.657 0.628  
(4.26)*** (2.01)** (3.42)*** (3.01)*** (3.08)*** (3.42)*** (4.41)*** (4.24)*** (4.83)*** (3.45)*** 
Avg salary2 –0.240 –0.176 –0.188 –0.198 –0.199 –0.225 –0.274 –0.250 –0.343 –0.341  
(3.68)*** (1.31) (2.02)** (1.89)* (1.99)** (2.39)** (3.17)*** (2.91)*** (3.52)*** (2.75)*** 
Avg salary3 0.034 0.023 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.032 0.041 0.037 0.055 0.059  
(3.09)*** (0.88) (1.23) (1.15) (1.23) (1.57) (2.21)** (1.92)* (2.55)** (2.24)** 
Winning percentage –0.129 –0.170 –0.112 –0.179 –0.119 –0.107 –0.080 –0.040 –0.062 –0.134  
(2.18)** (1.82)* (1.28) (2.14)** (1.60) (1.49) (1.28) (0.55) (0.76) (1.44) 
Avg experience –0.024 –0.020 –0.025 –0.022 –0.027 –0.024 –0.027 –0.027 –0.026 –0.026  
(6.79)*** (2.39)** (4.41)*** (3.93)*** (6.15)*** (5.19)*** (5.42)*** (6.21)*** (5.22)*** (4.90)*** 
National League = 1 0.024 0.032 0.020 0.022 0.032 0.026 0.025 0.027 0.020 0.014  
(2.77)*** (2.52)** (1.76)* (1.75)* (2.97)*** (3.24)*** (3.40)*** (3.26)*** (2.38)** (1.45) 
Revenue (1,000,000) 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  
(1.22) (0.36) (0.41) (0.88) (1.42) (2.09)** (2.64)*** (2.96)*** (1.80)* (1.28) 
Fan cost index 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 –0.001  
(0.09) (0.65) (1.58) (0.23) (0.12) (0.19) (0.08) (0.33) (1.03) (1.65) 
Constant 0.414 0.339 0.388 0.403 0.433 0.425 0.412 0.416 0.406 0.523  
(8.82)*** (3.15)*** (6.19)*** (5.07)*** (6.08)*** (7.05)*** (8.08)*** (8.10)*** (5.68)*** (5.25)*** 
R2 0.28                   
N 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
Notes: Dependent variable is team Gini index. 
For the OLS regression, robust t-statistics clustered at the team level are shown in parentheses. 
For the quantile regressions, t-statistics based upon bootstrapped SEs are shown in parentheses. Bootstraps are calculated from 100 repetitions. 
*p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
Source: Author’s calculations from data. 
IV. Conclusions 
This article uses data from the 2000 to 2012 MLB seasons and shows that changes made to revenue sharing in 
the 2007 CBA reduced team-level inequality, on average. This reduction is concentrated among hitters and those 
teams already experiencing relatively high levels of inequality. This overall decrease in within-team payroll 
inequality should help to increase on-field performance. Additionally, there is no effect on team inequality for 
pitchers. The different results for hitters and pitchers suggest that uniform regulations within CBAs can have 
heterogeneous effects on different groups of workers. Examining the 2007 CBAs effect on competitive balance 
in the league and explaining the differences between hitters and pitchers would be interesting areas for future 
research. 
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Notes 
1 The URLs for the USA Today website, Doug’s Statistics and Rodney Fort’s database 
are http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/salaries/index.htm; http://www.dougstats.com and https:/
/sites.google.com/site/rodswebpages/codes, respectively. 
2 Jewell et al. (2004) analyse the determinants of within-team payroll inequality from 1985 to 2000. 
3 The fan cost index is calculated by Team Marketing Report and can be found at Rodney Fort’s database. 
4 Equation 2 was re-estimated with team-level fixed-effects and again with team-level random-effects. Results 
are available upon request. The quantitative results are little changed and the qualitative results remain 
the same. 
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